By Alastair Crook

The troubles that have followed the Iranian presidential elections were not a frustrated East European-style “color revolution”; nor was presidential candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi’s movement an uprising of liberal Westernized sympathizers against the principles of the Iranian Revolution — albeit there were surely some who are hostile to the Revolution among his supporters.

Rather, what we have been witnessing is a power struggle between factions of the “Old Guard” clergy who all initially assumed power in 1979. As that dispute is settled over the coming months, we can expect big changes in the top ranks of the power elite. But the Revolution is not about to implode.

The essential dispute centers around prominent clerics, mainly former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who have sought to weaken President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s ability to pursue his populist attack on their privileged position. They also have sought to diminish the political weight of the Revolutionary Guard, which they see as increasingly at odds with their interests.

This faction of the elite is deeply threatened by Mr. Ahmadinejad’s assault on their personal wealth and by his claims that it was these senior clerics’ pursuit of their own narrow self-interest, at the expense of ordinary people, that is the root cause of Iran’s economic woes.

It was this group of powerful clerics that stood behind the Moussavi challenge to Mr. Ahmadinejad, and Mr. Khatami was designated by this faction to propose to Mr. Moussavi that he stand for election.

Thanks in no small part to this blessing, Mr. Moussavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, could credibly campaign on the platform of their revolutionary credentials: They were “children of the Revolution” and remained disciples of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Their quarrel, they made clear, was with Mr. Ahmadinejad and his conduct of government.

Mr. Moussavi’s casting of his mission as one of restoring the Revolution to its original ideals was not only an internal message; it was also replayed widely in the Arab media. But the West seemed to be hearing and hoping for something else: that he was challenging the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and would seek to flout the institutions of the Revolution.

That perception has opened Mr. Moussavi and his prominent backers to the risk of severe repercussions internally in the wake of the post-election turmoil.

Indeed, it is on the basis of such allegations that Hossein Shariatmadari, the influential editor of the conservative Kayhan newspaper, has called for both Mr. Moussavi and Mr. Khatami to face trial.

Paradoxically, the Western understanding that Mr. Ahmadinejad is a tool of the clerical leadership who stands with the repressive Revolutionary Guard and Basij (the popular militia) against reform could not be more wrong. It was Mr. Ahmadinejad who campaigned against the wealth and self-interest of some of the clerical elite. Mr. Moussavi was more closely allied to those interests.

The West should also understand that there are clerics in both Qum and Tehran, some of whom despise Mr. Ahmadinejad himself, who nonetheless share his view that some senior clerics have failed to actualize the spirit of the Revolution in their lifestyles. The Revolutionary Guard, too, is probably much more radical in wanting genuine reform than is generally understood.

What we are dealing with here is a complex struggle over the future course of the Revolution. It is a struggle for the future vision of Iran that is overlaid by deep personality differences that in turn arouse deep passions.

For now, it is clear that a powerful determination has emerged to exorcise the Rafsanjani-Khatami circles from the establishment, fueled by a growing popular anger as the evidence of their external links to the West is being carefully examined. Mr. Rafsanjani himself, who is well aware of the dangers of becoming isolated and excluded from the circles of power, is now walking a tight rope.

On July 4, he was quoted as saying that the election crisis reflected a power struggle at the “highest levels of the system.” In a carefully worded statement, he warned that any “awakened consciousness” could not be ignored, but also spoke of the need to safeguard revolutionary institutions. His Kargozaran party has gone further, calling the election results “unacceptable” as a result of “massive election fraud.”

The impact of these recent events on Iranian foreign policy is likely to be the opposite of what Western commentators have foreseen. It is not likely that the Revolutionary Guard, which is under the control of the supreme leader, will be paralyzed, but rather the reverse.

In many respects, the regional situation works to Iran’s advantage. Iraq remains at a crucial juncture; Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to be on the slide; Turkey has distanced itself from the European stance on the elections; and China has never before expressed such staunch solidarity with the Iranian regime. Neither Syria nor Hezbollah nor Hamas are poised to disengage with Iran.

As for Iran’s relations with the West, Mr. Ahmadinejad left hardly anything to interpretation when he stated at the end of June that, “Without doubt, Iran’s new government will have a more decisive and firmer approach toward the West. This time the Iranian nation’s reply will be harsh and more decisive.”

Similarly, Ayatollah Khamenei has made it clear that Iran will not easily forget the disparagement and condescension displayed toward the Islamic Republic in recent weeks. From the perspective of many in Iran, a “red line” was crossed as Western leaders seemed — from their perspective — to be trying to fan the dissent of Mr. Moussavi’s supporters into an instrument to de-legitimize the Revolution and execute “soft regime change.”

Despite such hopes in the West, however, an end to the Revolution is not in sight. More likely is a counterreaction that will lead to the isolation of Mr. Moussavi and his associates as popular forces allied with Mr. Ahmadinejad seek to inject new stimulus into the Revolution by cleansing it of the corrupted elements of its Old Guard.
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Alastair Crooke, a former British intelligence officer, heads the Conflicts Forum in Beirut. His most recent book is “Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution.” This Global Viewpoint article was distributed by Tribune Media Services.